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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ALiSHA ANN MURPHY,

)
NO. 40483

)

Petitioner-Appellant,

)
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CV 20082992

)
)

v.

)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

APPELLANTS REPLY BRION
REVIEW

)
)
)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a (successive) post-conviction appeal.

Before the Court of Appeals,

Alisha Murphy contended primarily that the district court erred in denying her motion for
appointment of counsel to assist in her successive post-conviction action. She argued
that four of the claims presented in her successive petition had, at a minimum, a
possibility of validity, such that counsel was required to have been appointed. With
regard to each of those four claims, she asserted that she had established that: (a) the
underlying claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel have a possibility of validity;
and (b) these claims were properly presented in a successive petition because, owing to
the incompetence of her original post-conviction attorneys, they were not asserted at all
in her original post-conviction case, they were inadequately investigated and asserted in
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the original case, and/or they were waived against Ms. Murphy's wishes in the original
case.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case
to the district court. With regard to the four claims argued about on appeal, the Court of
Appeals held there was no possibility of validity as to three of those claims. Thus, it held
that there was no error in denying counsel as to those three claims, and there was no
error in summarily dismissing those three claims.

However, as to the final claim, the

Court of Appeals held that there was a possibility of validity as to that claim, such that it
was error for the district court to have failed to appoint counsel, and it reversed the
district court's dismissal order as to that claim and remanded the case for further
proceedings-apparently on that claim only.
Ms. Murphy petitioned for review on the basis that the Court of Appeals should
not have remanded her case with an instruction that counsel be appointed to pursue
one claim only; the proper remedy was to vacate the district court's order denying her

motion for appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing her petition, and order that
counsel be appointed in the case. She asserted that, although this precise issue is a
question of first impression for this Court, the authorities (the UPCPA and existing Idaho
case law) point to the conclusion that if the petitioner raises the possibility of a single
valid claim, she is entitled to the assistance of counsel in the case generally.
This Court granted Ms. Murphy's petition and has agreed to review all issues in
the case.
With regard to the merits of her various claims, Ms. Murphy has previously
incorporated by reference the arguments presented to the Court of Appeals. Because
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the State has done the same, no reply as to those issues is required herein. However,
the State's arguments concerning the propriety of remanding Ms. Murphy's case for the
appointment of counsel as to only one claim do warrant further discussion. Thus, the
limited purpose of this Brief is to address those arguments.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in
Ms. Murphy's Appellant's Brief (Adjusted) and her Appellant's Brief in Support of
Petition for Review and, therefore, are not repeated herein.
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ISSUES
1.

Is Ms. Murphy entitled to relief on the grounds argued in her Appellant's Brief
(Adjusted) and her Appellant's Reply Brief?

2.

Assuming only a portion of Ms. Murphy's claims are determined to have the
possibility of validity, what is the appropriate remedy?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Ms. Murphy Is Entitled To Relief On The Grounds Argued In Her Briefing Before The
Court Of Appeals
Because both parties have, without elaboration, incorporated by reference their
briefing before the Court of Appeals as to the substantive claims presented, no further
discussion of those claims is required herein.

II.

Even If Only A Portion Of Ms. Murphy's Claims Are Found To Have The Possibility Of
Validity, The Appropriate Remedy Is To Vacate The District Court's Summary Dismissal
Order, Reverse The Order Denying Counsel, And Remand The Case Generally
As set forth in some detail in her Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for
Review, it is Ms. Murphy's contention that, if a pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
when considered in light of all of its supporting materials, is sufficient to raise even a
single possibly-valid claim, counsel should be appointed to represent the petitioner in
the case.

In response, the State argues that post-conviction petitions should be

evaluated claim-by-claim, and that counsel should be appointed only as to those
specific claims which appear to have the possibility of validity.
There are a number of flaws with the State's current position, most of which were
preemptively addressed in Ms. Murphy's Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for
Review. However, two of them deserve further mention.
First, Ms. Murphy has argued that existing precedent has suggested that if there
is a possibility of a valid claim, counsel should be appointed in the case generally. (See
Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.11-12 (quoting Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004), as speaking in terms of appointment of counsel in the
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"proceeding," not on a claim-by-claim basis).) In response, the State acknowledges the
authority cited by Ms. Murphy, but asserts that more recent authority suggests that
counsel may, in fact, be appointed on a claim-by-claim basis. (See Respondent's Brief
on Review, p.13 (citing Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007), and Mellon v. State, 148
Idaho 339 (2009).)
Contrary to the State's present contention, however, the Court has not
"repeatedly indicated that a trial court's obligation to appoint counsel extends only to
claims that are possibly valid 'such that a reasonable person with adequate means
would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim.'" (/d.
(quoting Swader).) The State misunderstands Swader. The portion of Swader which
discussed counsel conducting further investigation "into the claim," singular, was not
speaking in terms of the relief to be provided if it is determined that the district court
erred in failing to appoint counsel; it was discussing the standard for evaluating a claim
to determine whether that claim has the possibility of validity.1

Swader, 143 Idaho at

655. Indeed, the relief ultimately granted in Swader was not the appointment of counsel
as to one or more individual claims; it was a general remand with reversal of the order
denying the motion to appoint counsel. 2 Swader, 143 Idaho at 655.
Second, in its brief, the State cites three cases-Hust v. State,3 Charboneau, and

Swader-for the following proposition:

1 The same argument goes for Melton, the other case relied upon by the State. See
Melton, 148 Idaho at 342.
2 The petitioner in Swader raised a host of post-conviction claims. Swader, 143 Idaho
at 652-53. Notably, this Court did not analyze each and every one of them individually;
it simply discussed two of them before reversing the district court's order generally. Id.
at 654-55.
3 147 Idaho 682 (Ct. App. 2009).
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If, after reviewing the facts alleged in the petition, the trial court finds only
one potentially viable claim, it should appoint counsel for that claim and
give the petitioner notice of its intent to deny counsel and summarily
dismiss the remaining claims unless the petitioner alleges additional facts
to establish the possible validity of those claims.
(Respondent's Brief on Review, p.14 (emphasis added).) However, those cases simply
do not say that the district court can appoint counsel as to only a portion of the
petitioner's claims, while denying counsel as to the rest.

See Swader, 143 Idaho at

653-54 (discussing the requirement that the motion for appointment of counsel be
decided in advance of summary dismissal, and discussing the general standard that
counsel should be appointed if the petitioner has raised the possibility of a valid claim);
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (same); Hust, 147 Idaho at 684 (same). In fact, Hust
cites Charboneau for the proposition that "(o]nly if al/ of the claims alleged in the petition
are frivolous maya court deny a request for counsel," Hust, 147 Idaho at 684 (emphasis
added), and, as noted, Charboneau spoke in terms of the appointment of counsel in the
"proceeding,,,4 Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792.
Thus, contrary to the State's assertion. there is no existing precedent supporting
its contention that post-conviction petitions should be reviewed on a claim-by-claim
basis, and that, when potentially meritorious claims are identified, counsel should be
appointed only as to those claims. In fact, although this is technically an issue of first
impression for this Court, all signs point to the notion that, if a petition is non-frivolous,
counsel should be appointed in the case.

4 In Charboneau, the Court quoted favorably from Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676
(2001), wherein it was made clear that the standard for appointment of counsel is
whether "the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792
(quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679) (emphasis added). Accord Swader, 143 Idaho at
653.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in her previously-filed briefs,
Ms. Murphy respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying her motion for appointment of counsel, and vacate its summary dismissal order
and its order denying her I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion.

She further requests that this Court

remand her case to the district court with an order that counsel be appointed in the
case, and that an evidentiary hearing be conducted.

Alternatively, she requests

whatever lesser relief may be appropriate.
DATED this

day of March, 2013.

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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